INTRODUCTION
The purposes of this paper are: (1) to give appropriate de nitions of robustly-perfect ciphers, linear ciphers and bilinear ciphers; (2) to give two general constructions of robustly-perfect bilinear block ciphers that do not expand the plaintext and that have the smallest possible amount of secret key; (3) to give some isolated examples of robustly-perfect linear stream ciphers that use less key than had been earlier conjectured to be necessary; and (4) to suggest some possible useful applications for robustly-perfect linear and bilinear ciphers. Section 2 introduces the notion of a robustly-perfect block cipher and shows the connection of such ciphers to Latin squares. Linear and bilinear block ciphers are de ned in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Two general constructions of non-expanding, key-minimal robustly-perfect bilinear ciphers are also given in Section 4, and some as-yet-unanswered questions about such ciphers are raised. Section 5 gives a tentative general de nition of a linear stream cipher, and exhibits some counterexamples to a conjecture by Massey and Rueppel on the amount of key required in such ciphers. Finally, Section 6 suggests some possible practical applications for robustly-perfect linear and bilinear ciphers and points out some further open questions about such ciphers.
KEY-MINIMAL ROBUSTLY-PERFECT BLOCK CIPHERS
In a deterministic secret-key cipher, the ciphertext Y can be written in terms of the plaintext X and the key Z in the manner Y = f(X; Z) where f is a mapping from S x S z to S y where S x is the set of allowed plaintexts, S z is the set of allowed keys and S y is the set of possible ciphertexts. The probability distribution P X of X is determined by the plaintext source, but P Z is chosen by the cryptographer. It is always assumed that X and Z are statistically independent. The pair (f; P Z ) can be called the cipher system. The only essential requirement on f is that the enciphering must be decipherable by one who knows the key, i.e., f(x 1 ; z) = f(x 2 ; z) must imply x 1 = x 2 .
Until further notice, we shall be concerned only with block ciphers, which can be de ned as ciphers for which S x , S y and S z are all nite sets. Shannon 1, p .679] has de ned a cipher system (f; P Z ) to be perfect if X and Y are statistically independent. In this de nition, P X is assumed to be speci ed. It is natural to extend Shannon's de nition and to say that the cipher system (f; P Z ) is robustly perfect if it is perfect for all probability distributions P X on the set S x .
The Vernam cipher or \one-time pad", in which S x = S y = S z = f0; 1; 2; :::; m?1g,
where the addition is modulo m, and P Z is the uniform distribution on f0; 1; :::; m?1g, is robustly perfect. This follows from the fact that P Y jX (jji) = 1 m for all i and j, and hence P Y jX (jji) = P Y (j) = 1 m independently of the choice of P X . Shannon 1, p .681] has shown that, in a perfect cipher system, the number of keys #(S z ) must be at least as great as the number of plaintexts with non-zero probability. Thus, a robustly-perfect cipher system must have #(S z ) #(S x ). We shall say that a robustly-perfect cipher system is key-minimal if #(S z ) = #(S x ). A block cipher is non-expanding if #(S y ) = #(S x ). The one-time pad is thus seen to be a non-expanding key-minimal robustly-perfect cipher system. Shannon 1, p.681] has stated a proposition equivalent to the following: Proposition 1: A cipher system (f; P Z ) with #(S x ) = #(S y ) = #(S z ) is robustly-perfect if and only if (1) P Z is the uniform distribution on S z and (2) for every x and y in S x and S y , respectively, there is a unique z in S z such that y = f(x; z).
Shannon observed that condition (2) of the above proposition shows that the essential feature of a non-expanding key-minimal robustly-perfect cipher is that, with the rows indexed by the plaintexts and the columns indexed by the keys, the array of corresponding ciphertexts forms a Latin square. A Latin square 2] (of size n n) is an n n array, whose entries are drawn from an alphabet of n letters, with the property that each letter of the alphabet appears exactly once in each row and once in each column. The name \Latin square" comes from the fact that their rst systematic investigator, L. Euler, chose the rst n Latin letters as his alphabet, but most investigators today use the alphabet f1; 2; :::; ng. The following two examples of 7 7 Latin squares will be of interest in Section 3: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 4 1 5 6 2 7 3 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 5 3 6 2 7 1 4 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 6 4 2 7 1 3 5 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 7 6 1 3 4 5 2 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 2 5 7 1 3 4 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 3 7 4 5 6 2 1
If we take S x = S y = S z = f1; 2; :::; 7g, then the second of these Latin squares speci es, for instance, that the ciphertext y corresponding to the plaintext x = 3 and the key z = 5 can be found in the third row and fth column of this array and is thus y = 7, i.e. f(3; 5) = 7. Because P Z must be the uniform distribution in a non-expanding, key-minimal, robustlyperfect (NEKMRP) cipher system (f; P Z ), we can and will speak of the cipher f alone as NEKMRP. It is interesting to note that if the roles of the plaintext x and the key z are interchanged in an NEKMRP cipher, then the new cipher is also NEKMRP, as follows from the fact that the transpose of a Latin square is another Latin square. But x and y can also be interchanged in an NEKMRP cipher and the new cipher remains NEKMRP, as follows immediately from Proposition 1. Thus there is a complete interchangeability of variables in an NEKMRP cipher y = f(x; z) in the sense that any one of x, y and z can be taken as the \key" and either of the two remaining quantities can be taken as the \plaintext". This interchangeability is quite obvious for the one-time pad, but rather less so for the NEKMRP ciphers that will be given later.
LINEAR BLOCK CIPHERS
The notion of a \linear" cipher requires that the plaintext set, S x , and ciphertext set, S y , be vector spaces. The notion of a \block" cipher (to which our discussion is still restricted) demands that these same sets be nite. Thus, the notion of a \linear block" cipher demands that S x and S y be nite-dimensional vector spaces over a nite eld.
Here and hereafter, let F denote an arbitrary nite eld and let F n denote the vector space of Our interest will be in \robustly-perfect" linear ciphers. Some subtlety is required for an appropriate de nition of a \robustly-perfect" linear cipher, however, for the reason made clear by the following fact.
Proposition 2: If f is a linear cipher and if the cipher system (f; P Z ) is perfect for the plaintext distribution P X (where P X (0) 6 = 1 is assumed to avoid trivialities), then P X (0) = 0.
Proof: Because the cipher system is perfect, P XY (0; 0) = P X (0)P Y (0):
Because the cipher is linear, P Y jX (0j0) = 1 and thus P XY (0; 0) = P Y jX (0j0)P X (0) = P X (0):
Hence it follows that P X (0) = P X (0)P Y (0); which, because P Y (0) 6 = 1, implies that P X (0) = 0.
Remark: When P X (0) = 1, every cipher is trivially perfect since every Y is then statistically independent of X. Thus, excluding the case P X (0) = 1 excludes only this triviality.
Proposition 2 shows the appropriateness of de ning a linear cipher to be robustly-perfect if it is a robustly-perfect cipher for the restricted plaintext set F m ?f0g. In any linear cipher, the required decipherability of the enciphering transformation y = f(x; z) for every key z is equivalent to the requirement that y = 0 implies x = 0. Thus, the plaintext restriction to the set F m ?f0g automatically implies a corresponding ciphertext restriction to the set F n ?f0g.
If F = GF(q), the nite eld of q elements, then there are q m ? 1 plaintexts in the restricted plaintext set F m ?f0g. A robustly-perfect linear cipher is thus appropriately de ned to be key-minimal if also #(S z ) = q m ? 1. It follows that in a non-expanding key-minimal robustlyperfect (NEKMRP) linear cipher, the restricted plaintext set, the restricted ciphertext set, and the key set all have cardinality q m ? 1. It thus follows from Proposition 1 that the array of restricted ciphertexts for an NEKMRP cipher, with the rows indexed by the keys and the columns indexed by the restricted plaintexts, forms a (2 m ? 1) (2 m ? 1) Latin square and, conversely, that any linear cipher for which this array is a Latin square becomes an NEKMRP cipher when the keys are chosen to be equiprobable. Because (1) implies that the enciphering transformation y = f(x; z) of a linear cipher can be written as y = M z x (2) where M z is an n m matrix determined by the key z, and because decipherability implies that M z must have rank m, the Latin square characterization of an NEKMRP linear cipher is equivalent to the following matrix characterization. Thus, by Proposition 3, this linear cipher is NEKMRP when the keys each have probability 1=3.
This example is the q = 2, m = 2 special case of the rst of two general constructions of NEKMRP linear ciphers that will be given in the next section.
BILINEAR BLOCK CIPHERS
In order to de ne a \bilinear" cipher, we must require that S z , as well as S x and S y , be a vector space. It would seem natural then to de ne a \bilinear" cipher as a cipher such that (i) S x = F m , S y = F n and S z = F k , (ii) f satis es (1) 
for all c 1 2 F, c 2 2 F, z 1 2 F k and z 2 2 F k . However, (3) implies that f(x; 0) = 0 for all x 2 F m so that the decipherability condition cannot be satis ed for z = 0. Thus, the key z must belong to the restricted key set F k ?f0g in order to have a valid cipher; hereafter, we assume this restriction to hold and we then take conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) above together with the condition (iv) that the mapping y = f(x; z) be invertible for every xed z, z 6 = 0, as our de nition of a bilinear cipher.
Equations (1) and (3) and condition (iv) imply that the enciphering transformation y = f(x; z) of a bilinear cipher can be written as
where M z is an n m matrix of rank m when z 6 = 0 such that
But (5) The reader is invited to check that with the mapping from the binary vector (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) to the integer c 1 +2c 2 +4c 3 , this bilinear cipher corresponds exactly to the second of the two 7 7 Latin squares exhibited in Section 2, and is thus an NEKMRP cipher when the 7 keys are chosen to be equiprobable. 2 ) is readily checked to be (x 1 + x 2 )(z 1 + z 2 ) = (x 1 z 1 + x 2 z 2 ) + (x 1 z 2 + x 2 z 1 + x 2 z 2 ) ; which can be written more suggestively as (x 1 ; x 2 ) (z 1 ; z 2 ) = (x 1 z 1 + x 2 z 2 ; x 1 z 2 + x 2 z 1 + x 2 z 2 ):
For any F = GF(q) and any m, an NEKMRP bilinear cipher may be constructed as follows.
Construction 2:
(1) Take x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x m ), y = (y 1 ; y 2 ; :::; y m ) and z = (z 1 ; z 2 ; :::; z m ) to be the representations of non-zero elements x, y and z, respectively, of GF(q m ) as described above.
(2) Take the ciphering rule y = f(x; z) to correspond to the GF(q m ) equation If one takes F = GF(2), m = 3, and uses the mapping from GF( 2 3 )?f0g to f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7g such that i is mapped to i+1 where is a primitive element of GF (2 3 ), then the bilinear cipher (6) corresponds to the rst of the two Latin squares exhibited in Section 3.
Construction 2 can be generalized somewhat as follows. Let A, B and C be nonsingular m m matrices over GF(q), letx,ŷ andẑ be the elements of GF(q m ) represented by Ax, By and Cz, respectively, and replace equation (6) bŷ y =xẑ:
It is easily seen that this new cipher is again NEKMRP and, in fact, corresponds just to a change in basis for the representations of GF(q m ) used for x, y and z. We shall call any bilinear cipher constructed in this manner a multiplication cipher.
Some questions that as yet we have not been able to answer are: (1) Is an NEKMRP bilinear cipher obtained from Construction 1 always a multiplication cipher? (2) Is every NEKMRP bilinear cipher a multiplication cipher? (3) With an appropriate representation of the set of keys, is every NEKMRP linear cipher a bilinear cipher?
LINEAR AND BILINEAR STREAM CIPHERS
In this section we will be concerned with stream ciphers, which can be de ned as ciphers for which S x and S y (and also generally S z ) are in nite sets. We shall take S x , S y and S z to be 9) where d:e denotes the smallest integer equal to or greater than the enclosed number. We shall further say that such a cipher is linear if, whenZ is xed, each function g i is linear in its plaintext variables, and to be bilinear if it is linear and, whenX is xed, each function g i is also linear in its key variables.
A non-expanding additive stream cipher is robustly-perfect if, for any choice of statistics for the plaintext sequenceX, the running-key sequenceW is statistically independent of the plaintext sequenceX, andW is a sequence of statistically independent uniformly-distributed (i.u.d) random variables. Because (9) implies that W i = 0 when X i?1 = ::: = X i?M = 0 and the cipher is linear, it follows that a linear additive stream cipher with plaintext memory M cannot be robustly-perfect unless we enforce the plaintext M-restriction that no M consecutive digits inX can all be zeros.
We shall later consider a somewhat more severe plaintext restriction.
By an easy argument based on the entropies of theW andZ sequences, one sees that if the cipher (9) is robustly-perfect then the key-rate r is at least 1; we shall say the cipher is key-minimal if r = 1. (9) exists (for the plaintext M-restriction) with r < 2 for any M 2, (which implies that key-minimal robustly-perfect ciphers of this type do not exist). We will show this conjecture to be false by exhibiting key-minimal (i.e., r = 1), robustly-perfect for the plaintext M-restriction, additive bilinear stream ciphers for M = 2 and M = 3, namely, the binary i.e., F=GF (2) ; (15) respectively. The M-restriction onx in both cases is equivalent to the condition that the matrix M ix has no all-zero rows. By a straightforward but somewhat tedious induction, one shows that the matrices in (14) and (15) 6. POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS AND SOME REMARKS As any experienced cryptographer is aware, \linearity" in a cipher is generally one of the greatest assists to the enemy cryptanalyst who attacks it. Thus, we would not seriously propose using directly any of the linear or bilinear ciphers developed in this paper for any practical application where generally only a small amount of secret key (compared to the amount of plaintext) can be tolerated. The real point of this work is the fact that a robustly-perfect linear or bilinear cipher provides a mechanism by which one sequence ( the \key") e ectively randomizes another sequence (the \plaintext"). Indeed, Massey and Rueppel 5] used their robustly-perfect bilinear additive stream cipher (10) as a mechanism to combine two LFSR sequences to produce a cryptographically strong running-key sequence. The key-minimal robustly-perfect bilinear additive stream ciphers constructed in Section 5 should be even better sequence combiners. The keyminimal robustly-perfect bilinear block ciphers constructed in Section 4 might make excellent component ciphers, when interleaved with nonlinear transpositions, in a product cipher.
It is still a very open question whether, for any r < 2, one can for every M construct a plaintext-memory M bilinear (or just linear) additive stream cipher that is robustly-perfect for the plaintext M-restriction and has key-rate at least r. Although, we have not yet succeeded for any M > 3, our intuition now is that r = 1 is possible for every M. The possibly great potential of such r = 1 ciphers as sequence combiners suggests that this open question deserves some serious attention. It is also far from clear that our de nitions of \linear" and \bilinear" additive stream ciphers are the most appropriate ones, and some attention should be paid to alternative de nitions that might be still more natural.
